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**ВЕСТНИК**

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## **BACKGROUND AND FACTORS OF MUSLIM IMMIGRATION TO THE COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**

**Abstract.** The article analyzes the prerequisites, factors and consequences of immigration to the European Union from countries with a predominantly Muslim population. The main typological characteristics of the recipient countries of migrants from predominantly Muslim countries are highlighted. The problems studied in this article attract the attention of a wide range of specialists due to its relevance and at the same time due to the lack of any adequate answers to the modern challenges faced by the de facto multicultural societies of developed industrial countries. The results of consideration of the rights and freedoms of migrants in various EU countries are also important in scientific and practical terms.

Special attention is paid to the analysis of the situation in Germany, as the most attractive country for migrants. In the context of the ongoing changes in the ethnodemographic structure of the population, the forecast of the number and gender and age structure of the Muslim population in Germany by 2050 is given. This forecast suggests that the population of Muslim origin in Germany will increase from 4.3 million in 2014 to at least 5.8 million by 2050. The increase will be achieved mainly due to a higher fertility rate than that of the Germans.

According to the theory of E. Lee, the authors distinguish two groups of factors, "pushing factors" and "attraction factors", which contribute to the immigration of Muslims to more economically developed countries. The push factors in the countries of origin of migrants are mainly related to the unstable political situation, economic crises, and high unemployment, especially among the young population. Attracting factors are mainly related to the ability to receive certain economic preferences in the country of reception, to get educated, to have a stable income and medical care.

Along with certain benefits, expressed in an increase in the share of the working-age population, Muslim migration also carries certain risks for EU countries: socio-cultural, religious, criminal, economic, political and geopolitical factors that can significantly affect the balance of political forces in the EU countries.

The problems that arose with the adaptation and integration of Muslim migrants as a result of the largest migration crisis in the twenty-first century showed that the host country, in this case, the member States of the European Union, found themselves in a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, resolutions were prepared and adopted at the European level, and a set of measures was developed to accept migrants and provide them with financial and social assistance, which was expected to facilitate the process of adaptation and further lay the foundation for the assimilation of young Muslims. It was assumed that these steps will help, to some extent, to spread democratic values and principles for immigrants. On the other hand, in reality, the situation turned out to be much more complex and ambiguous, a number of EU States actually refused to accept migrants on their territories. The countries of the Visegrad group can be cited as an example. The split within the EU on migration issues calls the very existence of the European Union into question.

This paper uses data from Eurostat, the International organization for migration, the German statistical office, the European Commission, the European Statistical Office, and a number of other reputable statistical agencies as input data.

The material presented in the article does not contain information (information) related to state secrets of the countries of the European Union and the Russian Federation.

**Keywords:** international migration, migration crisis in the EU, Muslim migrants, proportion of Muslims in the EU, factors of immigration to the EU, integration of migrants, demographic consequences of immigration to the EU, demographic structure of the population of EU countries, non-integrated Muslim migrants, consequences of the migration crisis.

**Introduction.** Nowadays migration processes are an inherent part of world development. This phenomenon is caused by uneven economic development of states, high levels of poverty and unemployment in the context of globalization, and numerous inter-ethnic conflicts. At the beginning of 2018, every thirtieth person on the planet, which is a total of about 260 million people, lived outside their country of origin [1,2]. According to official statistics, the main migration flows consist of labor migrants heading to developed industrial countries to improve standards of living. In addition, it is important to point out that one of the most powerful factors for migration is the increase in the number of civil wars in various regions of the world. For example, 57% of refugees worldwide are from Syria (6.3 million), Afghanistan (2.4 million) and South Sudan (2.3 million) [1, 4].

It is noteworthy that all three countries have been actively engaged in hostilities for several years, and political and socio-economic stability in the short and medium term seems unlikely. In addition to the overall annual increase in the number of migration flows, the relevance of this issue can be traced through the prism of disputes between political elites and the lack of consensus on the issue. A notable example was the conflict between representatives of EU countries and the Turkish authorities regarding the reception of refugees being in a situation of forced migration found themselves in an extremely difficult situation and became hostages of political disputes [2].

The migration problem reached its peak in 2015, when due to the massive influx of refugees from Muslim countries in North Africa and the Middle East, the European Union committed itself to their accelerated distribution and granting of asylum [13]. The consequences for the European region were very mixed: on the one hand, immigration provides a large-scale flow of labor resources; on the other hand, due to cultural differences, a significant increase in the number of foreign unskilled labor undermines the national security of EU countries, a large number of terrorist attacks and robberies on the streets of Europe prove this fact.

Over time a gradual integration of migrants which to some extent represents a "humanitarian catastrophe" comes. This process is taking place against the backdrop of complex social problems faced by third-generation Muslim migrants and the challenges they pose to European countries. For example, the difference in the process of adaptation and attitudes of the first and third generation Muslims is significantly aggravated, since the latter behave aggressively and do not seek to adopt European values and lifestyle. Politicians are concerned that non-integrated Muslim migrants will form their own enclaves within European States, where they will revive their cultural environment, traditions and foundations, and thus will not pass through the integration process. This can lead to the emergence of criminal ethnic communities and, in general, can negatively affect the national security of individual countries and the region as a whole.

**Results.** The proportion of Muslims in the European Union (EU) is a relative minority: according to statistics, 9% of the population of the whole of France is Muslim, 5.7% is in the Netherlands, about 5.5% of Muslims live in Germany, in Austria there are about 4.4% of representatives of Islam among the local population. The total number of Muslims in Europe is from 5 to 7 percent, and they are mainly concentrated in Western Europe [2, 3, 4]. It is extremely important that many experts on migration processes in Europe state with full confidence that the number of representatives of the Muslim population may increase by about two or three times by 2030 [3].

Let's consider the change in the ethnodemographic structure of the population due to Muslim immigration in more detail on the example of Germany. According to the 2011 population census, there were 4.3 million Muslims living in Germany (5% of the total population), of which approximately 1.9 million have German nationality [3]. About 2.9 million of the Muslims were born in Turkey, 1.5 million of them have German citizenship [4]. It should be noted that the average age of Turks in Germany as of 2014 was 42.3 years. A cohort-component method can be used to predict the gender and age structure of the German population. For the accuracy of the forecast, several population groups are taken into account separately: 1) those who have German citizenship; 2) the foreign population of Germany from non-Muslim countries; 3) the foreign population of Germany from predominantly Muslim countries. For people with German citizenship, the gender and age structure at the end of 2014, age-specific mortality rates calculated according to the 2011 population census: the total birth rate of 1.4 (this corresponds, rather, to a negative scenario), the average mother age at birth of the first child is 30.5 years, the life expectancy of women is 83.4 years, men – 78.8 years. The foreign population from non-Muslim countries comes mainly from other EU countries and Russia, which is the fourth largest donor country for migrants.

To calculate the forecast, the average characteristics of the countries of origin of immigrants were used. The gender and age structure and age-specific mortality rates are quite close to the corresponding characteristics for Germany. The most significant difference is the total birth rate of 1.8. for the population from non-Muslim countries, immigration is set at the level of 50 thousand people per year for the entire forecast period. For foreign populations from Muslim countries, the gender and age structure, as well as other demographic characteristics, are very different from European ones, so different scenario parameters must be taken into account for different groups of origin countries of immigrants. Having made such assumptions, it can be determined that by 2050, the foreign population from Muslim countries will have reached 6% of the total population of Germany, which would double the number from 2014 (3%) [4].

Turkey has been taken up as a specific focus of the research, since the Turkish Diaspora is the most numerous one in Germany (about 1.9 million people have German citizenship, and over 1 million are non-German citizens) [12]. The gender and age structure of Turkish immigrants in Germany at the end of 2014 was published by German statistical office, while age-related mortality rates, the total birth rate, the average age of the mother at birth, the life expectancy of women and men - according to official statistics for Turkey published by the world Bank. Immigration from Turkey to Germany from 2015 to 2019 is planned for 50 thousand people, then - annually for 10 thousand people [12]. Similar data was also set by the German statistical office (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland) when building a forecast of the population of Germany until 2060. Given the trends of recent years (the rate of population growth from Muslim countries is significantly higher compared to the rest of the countries of origin of immigrants in Germany), as well as the assumption that in the future Germany will somehow limit the influx of immigrants, is plausible [12]. According to the forecast, the number of Muslims in Germany will increase from 4.3 million in 2014 to 5.8 million in 2050. In reality, the total number of people from Muslim countries may be higher due to a combination of factors, such as maintaining immigration at a fairly high level throughout the forecast period, as well as maintaining a high birth rate in the second and subsequent generations of immigrants.

Despite the current significant gender imbalance, which is characterized by a preponderance of men in the age groups of 20-45 years for immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries, by 2050, the gender and age structure is leveled in this regard. Moreover, in the older age groups (65 years and older), there is a preponderance of women from Muslim countries, which is typical for European countries. Thus, one can expect that in 35 years the demographic structure of immigrants from Muslim countries will become similar to the German population. There will be a gradual transition from a progressive (in the country of origin) to a stationary (in the host country) age structure of the population.

Despite the fact that the European migration crisis has passed its peak, the percentage of the Muslim population in the EU is only increasing every year. The European Union is one of the most attractive places for migrants. If we take into account the low fertility rate, which is clearly characteristic of European countries, we can conclude that this situation may lead to a change in the ratio of the population on religious grounds. In addition, it is very difficult to calculate the exact percentage of representatives of Islam in the EU countries due to the prohibition in various surveys to ask about the religious and ethnic affiliation of respondents.

It is also important to point out that when it comes to immigration of Muslims to EU member states, there are usually two types of factors that influence the decision of migrants to leave their homeland. "Push factors" in countries of origin and "pull factors" in host countries [8]. Both groups of factors must be taken into account for a full and comprehensive assessment of migration processes taking place on the European continent. The "push factors" include deep political crises, protracted civil wars, instability and insecurity in all its manifestations in the countries of origin of Muslims [8]. It is no secret that a number of countries in the Middle East and North Africa, where mass flows of Muslim migrants come from, have been a pocket of instability for a long time. However, the true turning point was the events of the end of 2010, namely the self-immolation of the Tunisian merchant Mohamed Bouazizi, who became a symbol of the phenomenon of the "Arab spring", and whose act marked the beginning of numerous demonstrations, protests and actions for regime change in many Muslim countries [10]. It is noteworthy that along with political mass protests, there was an active increase in the influence of terrorist groups, especially ISIL, which had an extremely negative impact on the security and stability of the development of the Muslim population [8, 10]. The next "pushing factor" is the unstable economic situation in the countries of origin



of Muslims, namely high unemployment, poverty and inappropriate working conditions. In addition, demographic factors can be identified [10]. The Arab States are the main donors of Muslim migrants to the EU and are characterized as countries with a (young) growing population and a predominantly progressive age structure [8, 10]. Thus, the proportion of young people aged 15 to 29 in Islamic countries is one of the highest in the world and is approaching 30 %. For comparison, in most Western countries it is less than 20 %. Half of the population of Syria, the West Bank (Palestine) and Iraq is younger than 21 years, Egypt – 24 years, Afghanistan – 18 years [5, 8].

Young people leave their native lands in order to get a quality European education and a prestigious job, which the Arab States can not offer them. The next and no less important factor is the environmental situation and various natural disasters that force the Muslim population to move to safer habitats [8]. In the Middle East, there is a problem of lack of clean drinking water due to a dry climate, low rainfall and inefficient agriculture; water in this region is becoming more expensive than oil. The factors listed above significantly influence the decision to leave the country for more favorable places of residence.

The next block of factors specific to host countries can be marked as “attraction factors” [8]. They encourage migrants to make a choice in favor of the prospects of living in European countries and leave their native countries. The list of these attractive factors includes: stable economic development of the EU member states, low unemployment rate, better working conditions, high wages, social benefits, the opportunity to get an elite European education, the absence of civil wars and political crises, a high frequency of terrorist attacks, and the security and stability of the European continent [8]. Therefore, one can conclude that there is a large set of factors that affect Muslim immigration to the European Union. Of course, economic reasons in a normal situation prevail over others.

As for the legal and institutional framework, the EU has long sought to unify legislation that regulates the status of third-country nationals arriving in EU member states for long-term residence. It should be noted that the member States themselves determine the conditions for obtaining residence permits and citizenship of a member state for third-country nationals. In 2004, the Council of the EU adopted the General basic principles for the integration of migrants, which were the responsibility of the EU member states. Migrants should be provided with the same access to education, health, and employment as EU citizens. In turn, migrants must comply with the laws of the host country, respect the established values, traditions and customs of the country, accept social and cultural norms, and know the official language and history of the host state. However, EU member States have the right to independently determine the method of granting asylum [13]. The conditions and social benefits provided to persons in need of asylum differ in one way or another in the EU member States [9, 13]. For example, in Austria, the state provides 50 euro a day for people living in public housing and 5 euro a day for food [9].

Also, after receiving refugee status, a work permit is issued. In Germany, refugees receive free meals at various reception centers throughout the country and about 145 euro per month to meet basic human needs [9]. One year and three months after applying for official refugee status or after receiving asylum, the state guarantees a basic income of 400 euro per month and covers all living expenses and heating of houses [9]. In the Czech Republic, after acquiring the status and obtaining all documents, full financial support is provided for obtaining a job in the country and finding suitable housing. In Denmark, about half of the Danish monthly unemployment benefit is allocated [9]. Asylum seekers can also apply for a job. In Norway, when applying for asylum, individuals receive travel documents, accommodation is paid by the state for up to five years, and money is also handed over in order to cover the cost of food and accommodation for two years [9, 13].

Due to the fact that many EU countries provide quite attractive social preferences for migrants and a fairly simple process for obtaining refugee status, this makes the European area a more desirable destination than developing countries such as Turkey, Iran, Jordan and a number of other states with lower economic indicators that also accept refugees. It should also be noted that those who share Islamic values in Europe can be divided into three groups: citizens of other origin, their children who were born on the territory of the EU, and indigenous Europeans who themselves have decided to adopt a different faith (this group is a minority). Until the middle of the last century, before the mass labor immigration of labor, Muslims came from the colonies and countries of the British Commonwealth. In the beginning, economically active migrants were perceived by native European citizens as ordinary foreigners, that is, not through a religious, but through an ethno-racial prism. The religious distinctive factor became apparent only in the 1990s. According to statistics, "European" Muslims do not form a single Islamic community.

Also there are different ethnic origins of Muslims in the EU: in Germany, most of them are Turks; in France and Italy - migrants from the regions of North Africa and the Middle East, and in the beginning of the new century, more and more immigrants from Bosnia and Albania were recorded; in the UK Muslims came mainly from Pakistan and Indonesia [5]. Scientists from the United States and Canada note that in Europe there was no unity on any pressing issue among the Islamic religious group, the so-called fragmentation of opinions may have a positive impact on European integration, but many consider this point controversial.

The presence of Islamic migrants in European countries has been noticeable for a long time. In the mid-1990s, some EU documents noted: "Intolerance towards Muslim communities in Europe is increasing", inter-ethnic tensions and ethnic-political tensions began to increase, and social problems were gaining momentum. The fact is that Muslims in EU countries, which have grown relatively quickly in number, are significantly poorer than the indigenous population. The local population began to perceive all of the above factors as a potential socio-political threat. In recent years, there has been a threat of inter-ethnic instability and tension throughout the European continent, which has forced the political elite of each EU member take issues of national security more seriously.

**Discussion.** We can identify several main consequences of Muslim immigration to European countries. First of all, we should note the *socio-cultural consequences* expressed by the transformation of the economy and the transformation of the service sector. Cities and districts of European countries are becoming similar to the appearance of the countries of origin of migrants (ethnically oriented cafes, restaurants, shops and markets). As a result, this leads to a gradual change in the features of European cities, which is the main way for immigrants to adapt to life in the host society.

Next and no less important are the religious consequences. They imply the rapid growth of the number of Muslims and the rapid spread of Islamic values and traditions in the EU countries. It is worth reminding that Muslim communities in European countries are not homogeneous – they profess different currents of Islam: Sunni (65 % of Muslims in Europe), alawites (14%), Shiites (7%), Salafists (represent 4% and are the most dangerous Islamic direction) [6, 11]. The representatives of Salafism originating from Saudi Arabia include numerous terrorist organizations and communities, among them such as «The Muslim Brotherhood», which is known around the world [6]. Today, Salafism is widespread in Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, in Russia in the North Caucasus, in the Republic of Tatarstan, in the countries of Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan [6]. The Salafist Ennahda party in Tunisia has a majority in the Parliament [6, 11].

**Criminal consequences.** After 2015, due to a sharp increase in the number of radical representatives of Islam, cases of violence, extremism and terrorism in the EU States increased. According to a study by the British newspaper Sunday Express, more than 4,000 fighters of the universally banned Islamic state group have entered Europe. Unfortunately, the EU does not yet have an effective way to identify individuals engaged in terrorist activities. As a result, the number of terrorist attacks and criminal offences committed by Muslim migrants who adhere to radical Islam has increased dramatically over the past five years. Many are simply not going to put up with European values and established ways of life, they feel the dominant position in the new land and behave extremely inappropriately and disrespectfully, which causes a negative attitude of the local population. Radical right-wing parties are emerging in the EU, which are in favor of deporting migrants from European countries and reducing quotas for obtaining refugee status, fearing the undermining of European culture and the loss of its identity. These parties have been actively gaining in popularity in the European arena in recent years.

One of the largest terrorist attacks occurred in the winter of January 2015, Europe was shocked by such a brutal armed attack on the editorial office of the newspaper Charlie Hebdo in Paris, which claimed the lives of twelve people. People were panicking after the largest terrorist attacks in France, which occurred on the night of November 14-15, 2015, where explosive devices were set off, resulting in the death of 153 people. One can also list the various terrorist attacks that took place one after another in Brussels in March 2016. Muslims belonging to the third generation of immigrants often commit crimes and have a tendency to actively participate in the criminal sphere due to the relatively low level of education received or due to its complete absence, are unemployed and do not seek a job, without knowledge of the language of the host society. According to news sources, the Muslim suburbs of Paris became the points of rallies and protests of unemployed youth who committed violent acts, Muslims

resisted the demands of the police, set fire to various public facilities and engaged in robbery. Social exclusion also plays an important role here. In France and Belgium, Muslim migrants are considered to be "second-class" citizens: they are not accepted for work, they do not have the opportunity to get a decent education, and they are often left to fend for themselves. These facts influence the decision of "deprived" migrants to switch to the path of radical Islam.

**Political consequences.** The indigenous population of Europe is beginning to express sharp dissatisfaction because of the actions of migrants, which gives rise to the growing popularity of radical movements, uprisings, and right-wing parties, which, as a rule, advocate tougher tolerant immigration policies of EU States. The local population is resisting the massive flows of refugees and criticized their governments for the unbalanced inclusion of migrants. Examples are the far-right „Alternative for Germany“ and „PEGIDA“ (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West) in Germany, “Wilders ' freedom” party gaining popularity among the population of the Netherlands, “The Swedish Democrats“ in Sweden, and the „National Front” in France. It should also be noted that the electoral geography has changed significantly in many EU regions. Angela Merkel and her “CDU” party have significantly lost their popularity in the German Parliament.

**Economic consequences.** It should be recognized that at the moment the EU member states bear only significant financial costs when accepting forced migrants to the territory of their countries. It is interesting that for the first time it was possible to calculate how much the EU countries will cost the migration crisis, in 2016, by order of the IMF. According to the analysis, the spending of the European Union countries will increase at least twice – from 0.08 to 0.19% of the total GDP of the European Union, which in general does not pose a threat to the economy of the region [7]. However, the calculations were very inaccurate. Analysts did not take into account irregular migrants who arrived by sea, which is almost 365 thousand people, considering that more than 1 million people entered the EU a year earlier. In addition, the costs of refugee education, social assistance, and the costly deportation process were not included in the calculation [7]. Currently, Europe is experiencing economic difficulties, which directly affects the population. Citizens of European countries expect additional support, subsidies, and state benefits [7]. The usual generous program of social benefits leads to the fact that it is more profitable for people to stay at home and not work. As a result, many refugees find it difficult to adapt to the labor market, simply declare themselves unemployed and live on state money. According to statistics, during the migration crisis, Germany alone spent a total of almost 110 billion euro on the reception and social security of migrants.

**Demographic consequences.** In view of the migration crisis, there is a sharp change in the demographic structure of European society, experts highlight the most important of them: the visible disparity by gender (the proportion of the male population), by age in religious groups (there are more Muslim children of preschool and school ages), by status (increasing the number of single males). These trends may seem positive, especially given the influx of young people in an aging population. According to the forecasts of the European Statistical Office from 2025 to 2050, the entire population of the EU will significantly decrease by one-fifth to approximately 450 million people, and the number of economically active people (aged 15 to 64 years) will decrease to 57% by 2050 from 67% at the beginning of the two thousandth [8, 15]. It should be noted that Canada based on the experience of European countries, has restricted the admission of single men from Muslim countries, especially from Syria. Now the country is only accepting women with children or men with families. Unaccompanied minors and unmarried men are restricted from entering and receiving refugee status in Canada.

**The geopolitical consequences.** On migration policy, the European Union is divided into two camps: those who view the reception of migrants positively and those who oppose the "open door" policy. The European migration crisis has caused a sharp contradiction between EU member states, which are used to sharing common political and national interests. First of all, it is worth highlighting that Denmark and Austria, which have taken a very tough position regarding the acceptance of a mass flow of foreigners to their territory, are seeing this as a potential threat to the security of the region [9]. Austria has started building barriers on its borders, imposed strict border controls, introduced strict regulations and rules for refugees, and reduced quotas. The Austrian authorities, represented by the Prime Minister of Austria B. Sobotka, blamed the migration crisis on German Chancellor A. Merkel, who actively called on the EU to accept refugees. Similarly, Denmark has introduced strict controls at its border checkpoints and introduced a law on the obligation of migrants to pay for their stay on the territory of the state, even with their

personal belongings. In addition, the countries of the Visegrad group (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary) supported a sharp restriction of the flow of immigrants to their countries [9].

**Conclusion.** Consequently, we can conclude that the upheaval associated with the European migration crisis of 2014-2016 and the active flow of population from Muslim countries significantly changed the ethno-cultural structure of the population of European States, which led to significant socio-economic and socio-political consequences, which were highlighted in the articles [14, 15, 16]. The problems associated with the adaptation of Muslim migrants and the dire consequences of the largest in the twenty-first century migration crisis, described as the biggest crisis after the Second World war, showed that the receiving party, in this case, members of the European Union were in a contradictory situation. A number of documents were prepared, as well as a set of measures to accept migrants, but this did not help facilitate the process of migrants adaptation and integration, and in the future lay the foundation for the assimilation of young Muslims [14, 17]. Also taking into account the fact that the number of the native population of Germany is declining due to aging, as well as the extremely low fertility rate among the local population, the obtained forecasts in the article indicate a very significant increase in the share of the Muslim population not only in Germany, but also throughout Western Europe over the next 35 years.

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#### **ЕУРОПАЛЫҚ ОДАҚ ЕЛДЕРІНЕ МҰСЫЛМАНДЫҚ ИММИГРАЦИЯНЫҢ НЕГІЗДЕРІ МЕН ФАКТОРЛАРЫ**

**Аннотация.** Мақалада негізінен мұсылман халқы бар елдерден Еуропалық Одақ елдеріне көшудің алғышарттары, факторлары мен салдары талданады. Мұсылман елдерінен мигранттарды қабылдаушы елдердің негізгі типологиялық сипаттамалары көрсетілген. Осы мақалада зерделенген мәселелер өзектілігіне байланысты және дамыған индустриалды елдердің іс жүзінде мультимәдениетті қоғамдары тап болатын қазіргі заманғы сын-қатерлерге тиісті жауаптардың болмауына байланысты көптеген мамандардың назарын аударады. Еуропалық Одақтың әртүрлі елдеріндегі мигранттардың құқықтары мен бостандықтарын қарастырудың нәтижелері ғылыми және практикалық тұрғыдан маңызды.

Жұмыста Германиядағы ахуалды талдауға ерекше көңіл бөлінеді, өйткені мигранттар үшін ең тартымды ел. Халықтың этно-демографиялық құрылымындағы жалғасып жатқан өзгерістер жағдайында 2050 жылға қарай Германиядағы мұсылман тұрғындарының мөлшері, жасы және гендерлік құрылымына болжам жасалады. Жасалған болжам Германиядағы мұсылмандықтардың саны 2014 жылы 4,300,000 адамнан 2050 жылға қарай кем дегенде 5 800 000 адамға дейін артады деген қорытынды жасауға мүмкіндік береді. Бұл көбінесе немістерге қарағанда туудың жоғары болуымен қамтамасыз етіледі.

Э. Лидің теориясына сәйкес, авторлар мұсылмандардың экономикалық тұрғыдан дамыған елдерге көшуіне ықпал ететін факторлардың екі тобын ажыратады: «итеруші факторлар» және «тарту факторлары». Мигранттар шыққан елдерде қозғаушы факторлар негізінен тұрақсыз саяси жағдаймен, экономикалық дағдарыстармен, жұмыссыздықтың жоғары деңгейімен, әсіресе жас тұрғындармен байланысты. Тартымды факторлар негізінен қабылдаушы елде белгілі бір экономикалық жеңілдіктер алу, білім алу, тұрақты табыс және медициналық көмек алу мүмкіндігіне байланысты.

Бұл жұмыста бастапқы деректер ретінде біз Еуропалық статистика бюросының, Халықаралық көші-қон ұйымының, Германия статистикалық бюросының, Еуропалық комиссиясының, Еуропалық статистикалық бюроның және басқа да беделді статистикалық агенттіктердің деректерін қолданамыз.

Мақалада ұсынылған материалда Еуропалық Одақ және Ресей Федерациясының елдерінің мемлекеттік құпияларына қатысты ақпарат жоқ. Барлық материалдар Еуропалық Одақ елдерінің ресми ресми көздерінен алынды.

**Түйін сөздер:** халықаралық көші-қон, Еуропалық Одақтағы миграциялық дағдарыс, Мұсылман мигранттары, Еуропалық Одақ елдеріндегі мұсылмандардың үлесі, Еуропалық Одаққа иммиграция факторлары, мигранттардың интеграциясы, Еуропалық Одаққа иммиграцияның демографиялық әсерлері, Еуропалық Одақ елдері халқының демографиялық құрылымы, интеграцияланбаған мұсылман мигранттары, көші-қон дағдарысының салдары.

*Мақала жас ғалымдардың ғылыми жұмыстарды докторлар мен кандидаттардың жетекшілігімен Ресейдің СІМ ММХМО № КМУ-10/01 гранты бойынша дайындалды.*

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### ПРЕДПОСЫЛКИ И ФАКТОРЫ МУСУЛЬМАНСКОЙ ИММИГРАЦИИ В СТРАНЫ ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО СОЮЗА

**Аннотация.** В статье дается анализ предпосылок, факторов и последствий иммиграции в страны Европейского Союза из стран с преимущественно мусульманским населением. Выделяются основные типологические характеристики стран-реципиентов мигрантов из преимущественно мусульманских стран. Проблематика, исследуемая в данной статье, привлекает внимание широкого круга специалистов в силу ее актуальности и одновременно из-за отсутствия сколько-нибудь адекватных ответов на современные вызовы, с которыми столкнулись ставшие де-факто мультикультурными общества развитых индустриальных стран. Важными в научно-практическом плане представляются также результаты рассмотрения прав и свобод мигрантов в различных странах Европейского Союза.

Особое место в работе уделяется анализу ситуации в Германии как стране, наиболее привлекательной для мигрантов. В контексте происходящих изменений в этнодемографической структуре населения дается прогноз численности и половозрастной структуры мусульманского населения на территории Германии к 2050 году. Выполненный прогноз позволяет заключить, что численность населения мусульманского происхождения в Германии возрастет с 4 300 000 человек в 2014 году как минимум до 5 800 000 человек к 2050 году. Прирост будет обеспечиваться в основном за счет более высокого, нежели у немцев, уровня рождаемости.

В соответствии с теорией Э. Ли, авторами выделяется две группы факторов, «выталкивающие факторы» и «факторы притяжения», которые способствуют иммиграции мусульман в более развитые в экономическом плане страны. Выталкивающие факторы, действующие в странах происхождения мигрантов, преимущественно связаны с нестабильной политической ситуацией, экономическими кризисами, высоким уровнем безработицы, в особенности среди молодого населения. Притягивающие же факторы в основном связаны с возможностью получать определенные экономические преференции в стране приема, получать образование, иметь стабильный заработок и медицинскую помощь.

В качестве исходных данных в настоящей работе используются данные Европейского статистического ведомства, Международной организации по миграции, Немецкого статистического ведомства, Европейской Комиссии, Европейского Статистического Бюро, ряда других авторитетных статистических агентств.

Материал, представленный в статье, не содержит сведений (информацию), относящихся к государственной тайне стран Европейского союза и Российской Федерации. Весь материал был взят из открытых официальных источников стран Европейского Союза.

**Ключевые слова:** международная миграция, миграционный кризис в Европейском Союзе, мигранты-мусульмане, доля мусульман в странах Европейского Союза, факторы иммиграции в Европейский Союз, интеграция мигрантов, демографические последствия иммиграции в Европейский Союз, демографическая структура населения стран Европейского Союза, неинтегрированные мигранты-мусульмане, последствия миграционного кризиса.

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